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Abstract 8 
Purpose: The purpose of this article is to clarify the underdeveloped conceptualization of a particular 9 
type network rents, defined as knowledge recombination rents, related to the possibility for a firm to 10 
transfer and recombine knowledge within and across its portfolio of inter-organizational relationships. 11 
Design/methodology/approach: Adopting a contingency approach, we develop a comprehensive 12 
model with propositions drawn from an original synthesis of the extant literature on the management 13 
of inter-organizational relationships. 14 
Findings: We summarize the most important internal and external variables that explain how 15 
knowledge recombination rents arise within a firm’s portfolio of inter-organizational relationships. We 16 
create a seven-proposition model that considers: an “internal fit”, related to internal contingencies of 17 
the firm, specifically life stage and its strategy; an “external fit”, related to external contingencies of the 18 
network of the firm, specifically past experience and current portfolio structure.  19 
Research limitations/implications: The model is theory-driven. Future research is needed to 20 
empirically validate the propositions, especially in different industries and contexts.  21 
Practical implications: Our model, beyond the fact of being theoretically sounded, is also completely 22 
practical oriented. Indeed, we developed a comprehensive model articulated in seven propositions 23 
which relationship managers can easily use to analyze and manage their portfolios of inter-24 
organizational relationships. 25 
Originality/value: Our model allows us to assert that the value of an inter-organizational relationship 26 
is not fixed nor just related to the single dyadic interaction; rather before engaging with a relationship 27 
is crucial to ponder possible benefits and harms. This is the central element in our contribution that 28 
develops an easy-to-use and comprehensive model based on best practices. 29 
 30 
Keywords: Knowledge Recominbination Rents, Knowledge Transfers and Spillovers, Recombination 31 
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Introduction 34 
In recent years, the strategic management of knowledge has increasingly turned its 35 
attention to the relational rents that can be created through inter-organizational relationships, 36 
partnerships, and alliances (Dyer & Singh, 1998). An impressive body of literature has 37 
emerged in order to understand how organizations can create relational rents through the 38 
transfer of knowledge within individual inter-organizational relationships. However, it is less 39 
clear how knowledge is transferred across the relationships within a company’s portfolio of 40 
relationships. This represents a significant gap within the literature as the ability to transfer 41 
knowledge across a portfolio of relationships is vitally important for organizations as it 42 
allows them to understand what is the potential for recombining the different knowledges 43 
residing in different relationships to create new sources of rent, henceforth known as 44 
‘knowledge recombination rents’. 45 
Within the extant literature on knowledge transfer and relational rents, relational rents 46 
are typically conceptualized at the level of the dyad and focus on the idiosyncratic matching 47 
of jointly owned resources, shared capabilities and the coordinated efforts of both 48 
organizations within a given relationship (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006). While this 49 
concept of dyadic rent is useful for understanding knowledge transfer within individual inter-50 
organizational relationships, it has a number of limitations as a tool for understanding how 51 
knowledge is transferred across relationships within a portfolio to create knowledge 52 
recombination rents. First, relationships are not isolated, unrelated business processes but 53 
occur simultaneously and reciprocal influences especially for the most innovative 54 
organizations (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). Second, the portfolio space in which 55 
such relationships are managed is not merely a frame for these business processes but rather a 56 
factor influencing the structure and evolution of relationships (Gulati, 1998). In recognition 57 
of these facts, inter-organizational studies have expanded the focus from the dyadic level to 58 
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the network level of a firm (Yang, Lin, & Lin, 2010). This network approach facilitates a 59 
better understanding of how organization manage their entire portfolio of relationships 60 
alliances (Zhao, 2014) and manage these business processes more holistically to produce 61 
knowledge recombination rents. Despite the extensive debate on the topic (e.g. Lavie, 2006; 62 
Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004; Sidhu, Commandeur & Volberda, 2007), the extant literature is 63 
still lacking a clear and analytic representation of the rents that arise from the recombination 64 
of firms’ knowledge within a portfolio of relationships and this is exactly the gap that we aim 65 
to fill in this paper with our novel concept of ‘knowledge recombination rents’.  66 
Thus, this paper, is positioned within the broader field of studies investigating the 67 
impact of managing knowledge on partnership strategies, and aims at answering the 68 
following research question: What conditions and factors increase knowledge recombination 69 
rents within a company’s portfolio of relationships? We developed a model made of seven 70 
propositions on the nature and development of these knowledge recombination rents.  71 
Consistent with the extant literature (e.g., Ronald S Burt, 2000; Jiang, Tao, & 72 
Santoro, 2010; Koka & Prescott, 2008; Pett & Clay Dibrell, 2001; Zhao, 2014), we adopt a 73 
contingency approach (e.g., Pratono, 2016; Zaheer & Bell, 2005) in order to focus on the 74 
internal and external conditions of fit (Zajac, Kraatz, & Bresser, 2000) that determine how 75 
firms are able to create potential knowledge recombination rents through their portfolio of 76 
inter-organizational relationships.  77 
We are determining what is the potential value of such knowledge transfer as in 78 
purely RV approach, which indeed interprets relational value as a combination of resources 79 
and capability strategically developed and deployed (Dyer & Singh, 1998), rather than the 80 
dynamic capabilities approach (Zollo & Winter, 2002), which is more interested in studying 81 
processes and routines apt to catch such relational value (Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999).    82 
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The contribution of our work to the literature is twofold. The first contribution is 83 
theoretical. We present a holistic framework that is able to show how a company can 84 
recombine knowledge within its portfolio of relationships and thus deepens our 85 
understanding of the most important aspects that should be considered ex-ante before 86 
starting. The second contribution is practical. The framework can be used by organizations as 87 
an “easy to use” tool based on seven points that managers can use in the strategic planning 88 
process for their portfolios of inter-organizational relationships.  89 
The paper is structured as follows: a problem statement made in this introduction, our 90 
model of knowledge recombination rents is presented in the ‘Model Development’ section; 91 
next seven propositions present the contingencies that will determine the possibilities for 92 
knowledge recombination rents within a portfolio of relationships; next, we discuss the 93 
managerial implications of each proposition; and finally, we discuss conclusions, limitations 94 
and future research directions. 95 
 96 
Model Development  97 
Extension of the concept of relational rents to the portfolio level 98 
The foundational theory upon which our theoretical model is constructed is that of the 99 
relational view (RV). This theory states that a relationship can provide a unique source of 100 
profit through the jointly created and idiosyncratic elements developed within the context of 101 
an inter-organizational relation (Dyer & Singh, 1998). This type of profit is known as 102 
relational rent and is defined as: 103 
“supernormal profit jointly generated in an exchange relationship that cannot be 104 
generated by either firm in isolation and can only be created through the joint idiosyncratic 105 
contributions of the specific alliance partners” (Dyer & Singh, 1998, p. 662). 106 
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In this paper, we adopt an extended concept of relational rent that draws upon the 107 
concepts of appropriated relational rents and spillover rents (Lavie, 2006). Appropriated 108 
relational rents come from the “real” interaction between two parties, i.e. they are outcomes 109 
of the process of sharing resources. In Lavie’s vision, they are called appropriated in as much 110 
as jointly achieved outcomes can be appropriated depending upon the absorptive capacity, 111 
bargain power and opportunism of the parties to the relationship. Spillover rents, also known 112 
as knowledge leakages, are rents derived from an unintended effect of levering a resource. 113 
Examples of such spillovers include the imitation of technologies, business models or 114 
productive layouts and the copying of patented products. Opportunistic behaviour, bargaining 115 
power and absorptive capacity have positive influences on the creation of these rents while 116 
mechanisms of isolation reduce it (Lavie, 2006).  117 
Our model uses Lavie’s (2006) concept of extended relational rent to explore how 118 
knowledge is transferred and recombined within the firm’s portfolio of inter-organizational 119 
relationships, which we conceptualize as the ego-network space that consists of the set of 120 
relationships a firm has with other organizations and the recombination of different firms’ 121 
knowledge patrimonies (e.g., Jin-Hai, Anderson, & Harrison, 2003; Kogut & Zander, 1992; 122 
LeLoarne & Maalaoui, 2015). Indeed, we argue that a complete understanding of relational 123 
rents can only be achieved with a complex three level model consisting of: internal rents, i.e. 124 
the idiosyncratic combination of internal resources and capability belonging to a firm; 125 
relational rents, i.e. the appropriated relational rents and spillovers, which are the 126 
idiosyncratic synergies achievable in a relationship (Lavie, 2006); and finally, knowledge 127 
recombination rents that are achieved at the portfolio level. In the RV literature, the final 128 
perspective is underdeveloped (Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007) and will be developed within 129 
our model. 130 
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The three pillars of knowledge recombination rents  131 
Our concept of knowledge recombination rents consists of three pillars, which are 132 
presented in Table1 below.  133 
**** Insert Table 1 about here**** 134 
 135 
The first pillar delineates what knowledge recombination rents are. Our basic 136 
definition of knowledge recombination rent is the rent that results from the recombination of 137 
multiple knowledges among multiple relationship partners. This represents a departure from 138 
the extant literature, which has tended to focus on the recombination of knowledge between 139 
two relationship partners (e.g., Lavie, 2006). 140 
The second pillar concerns how these rents are generated. To understand this, we need 141 
to differentiate between potential and realized knowledge recombination rents. Potential 142 
recombination rents are the range of opportunities that exist to recombine knowledge within a 143 
portfolio of inter-organizational relationships. As we premised, our model explains how to 144 
evaluate and spot potential knowledge recombination rents that can arise from a specific 145 
configuration of a firm’s inter-organizational relationships portfolio. Thus, in line with a RV 146 
approach (Dyer & Singh, 1998), we are concerned about individuating specific conditions 147 
and configurations of a portfolio.  148 
 149 
Realized recombination rents instead are those that the firm is actually able to 150 
appropriate within the real relationship context. This second step instead is more related to 151 
the dynamic capabilities possessed by the firm, such its relational capability and absorption 152 
capacity just to name a few of the most important for these matters (Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 153 
1999; Zollo & Winter, 2002). However, due to space constrains, this second aspect is not 154 
included in the present study.   155 
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Figure 1 visually summarises the two pillars stressed up to this point. The focal firm 156 
in a relationship context gets access to internal, appropriated and spillover rents, which do not 157 
depend upon the firm’s involvement within a network. The potential to earn knowledge 158 
recombination rents starts when the focal firm strategically interprets the possibility to 159 
recombine one of its precedent rents with other rents obtained or obtainable in other 160 
relationship contexts. In the end, the realization of these potential rents will depend upon the 161 
relationship context, the firm’s dynamic capabilities, and the interaction between the focal 162 
firm and its partner. 163 
**** Insert Figure 1 about here**** 164 
 165 
‘When’ is the third and final pillar of our definition and concerns the conditions under 166 
which knowledge recombination rents at the level of the portfolio can be increased or 167 
reduced. The third pillar is the central contribution of our model. We adopt a contingency 168 
approach, since different contingencies, either internal or external, experienced by the focal 169 
firm require different adjustments and alignments to find a fit within the inter-organizational 170 
portfolio (Miles & Snow, 1994). So, our definition of fit is related to an intentional searched 171 
accordance between relevant firm’ conditions and the ego-network of relationships possessed 172 
in order to boost the performance (Zajac, Kraatz, & Bresser, 2000). In the specific case, an 173 
internal fit is a positive condition of alignment between internal elements of the firm and the 174 
portfolio which leads to the creation of what we termed internal knowledge recombination 175 
rents. An external fit instead regards a positive condition of alignment between external 176 
(relational) elements of the firm and the portfolio which leads to the creation of what we 177 
termed external knowledge recombination rents. 178 
These fits will be discussed in more detail in the following sections. 179 
Knowledge transfer within relationship portfolios: the creation of knowledge 
recombination rents 
8 
 
 180 
Internal knowledge recombination rents (internal fit) 181 
The first contingencies that we will be presented in our model are those related to 182 
internal fit. There are two types of contingency presented: evolution stage and strategy which 183 
need to find alignment with the portfolio, thus a fit.  184 
Evolution stage fit 185 
The first element with which the portfolio should find an alignment and a fit is the 186 
evolution stage. We refer to this element as the life stage of a firm in which we may 187 
distinguish two phases. The first is related to the “infancy of firm” from its formation to its 188 
survival (Davidsson & Honig, 2003), while the maturity phase can be regarded as the stage in 189 
which a firm has been established and created a source of competitive advantage within its 190 
industry (Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000). This stage also includes episodes of crises, decline and 191 
rejuvenation (e.g., McKinley, 1993; Stopford & Baden-Fuller, 1990). 192 
To develop our propositions on the fit of the evolution stage, we draw upon the 193 
entrepreneurial literature. Although new entrepreneurs are often innovators within their 194 
industries (Christensen & Bower, 1996; LeLoarne & Maalaoui, 2015; Rothaermel, 2001), 195 
they encounter significant challenges, such as demonstrating their worth to the industry and 196 
striving against competitive pressures within a scarce-resource environment. Hence, the core 197 
ability of new entrepreneurs is to successfully attain, at minimum cost, the necessary 198 
resources needed to compete while often having to rely only on what is at hand, such as their 199 
existing relations and kinships (Hanlon & Saunders, 2007). 200 
Intuitively, it is easier for new entrepreneurs to succeed when supported by a social 201 
structure constituted by a high number of bonding ties with embedded elements of trust, 202 
mutual reciprocity and strong emotional commitment that transcend purely rational and 203 
economic logics (Chung, Luo, & Wagner, 2006; Huggins, 2010; Zhao, 2014). When 204 
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implementing entrepreneurial strategies, these networks will likely obtain better results than 205 
networks constituted by relationships based on a more transactional logic, such as relations 206 
with new business partners (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003). This is consistent with the perspective 207 
of transaction cost economics in which strong ties are built upon reiterated exchanges with 208 
the same partner, who becomes increasingly trustworthy and incurs lower transactions costs 209 
as a result (Williamson, 1975). 210 
For new entrepreneurs within an industry, newness is often a liability as much as a 211 
benefit but it is a liability that can be offset through establishing a portfolio of collaborative 212 
relationships that forms a network of bonding ties (Abatecola, Cafferata, & Poggesi, 2012). 213 
First, the new companies often need to cooperate (chiefly with the incumbents) due to a 214 
resource endowment that is not yet completely developed, e.g. in biotechnology industry the 215 
young firms are often very research-oriented but may lack commercial experience (Durand, 216 
Bruyaka, & Mangematin, 2008; Hine & Kapeleris, 2006; Powell et al., 1996). Second, young 217 
ventures can exploit collaborations with high-status incumbents to signal to the market their 218 
reliability as an enterprise (Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999), for example, encouraging 219 
venture capitalists to invest (MacMillan, Siegel, & Narasimha, 1985). Further, working with 220 
well-known partners and within a close network will ensure that behaviour that might 221 
considered deviant within the industry is censured (Davidsson & Honig, 2003). 222 
This ability to meet the expectations of the market through relationships with industry 223 
incumbents gives the new ventures “legitimacy” (Lacam & Salvetat, 2017; Zimmerman & 224 
Zeitz, 2002), which requires the new firm to repeatedly abide by the rules and norms of 225 
within the industry. This is in line with our extended definition of knowledge recombination 226 
rents in which value is created through a series of positive feedback loops between the new 227 
firm and industry incumbents (e.g., Batocchio, Ghezzi, & Rangone, 2016). This is confirmed 228 
in many empirical studies. For instance, Yli-Renko et al. (2001) found that young 229 
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knowledge-based firms perform better if they have repeated and intense interactions with 230 
industry incumbents. Similarly, Hansen (1995) found that for start-up companies the closure 231 
of their ego-network and the frequency of interactions within the network were the most 232 
important predictors of growth, especially when these variables are co-present.  233 
In conclusion, new entrepreneurs need a portfolio of inter-organizational relationships 234 
that forms a relatively closed network of closely-tied actors in order to: receive support, 235 
access resources and capabilities, gain legitimacy and protect themselves from opportunism 236 
(Hanlon & Saunders, 2007; Zhao, 2014). This leads us the development of our first 237 
propositions: 238 
 239 
Proposition 1.a: In a start-up phase, a portfolio structure with a predominance of 240 
bonding ties, which forms a close network structure, will be most favourable to the creation 241 
of knowledge recombination rents.  242 
 243 
Proposition 1.b: In a start-up phase, a portfolio structure with a predominance of 244 
bridging ties, which forms a sparse network structure, is unfavourable to the creation of 245 
knowledge recombination rents. 246 
 247 
Contrary instead seems to be the situation after the susses of a firm on the market; to 248 
analyse this firm contingency in respect to its portfolio we draw upon the literature on 249 
network and structural holes (e.g., Burt, 2000). The incumbents within an industry often 250 
struggle to respond to the rapid, and often radical, changes in technology affecting their 251 
industries (Christensen & Bower, 1996). Therefore, establishing relationships with innovative 252 
new ventures is a well-established method to respond to the problem of breakthrough 253 
technology (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003). Nevertheless, embarking upon relationships with 254 
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these businesses is not a risk free activity for incumbent firms (Rothaermel, 2001). To 255 
manage the risks of working with unknown business partners, incumbents are advised to 256 
maintain relationships with a wide range of new ventures and have flexible agreements in 257 
place (Williamson, 1991). This portfolio structure would consist of bridging ties and allow 258 
the incumbent to reach a broker position within the network, reaping the advantages of 259 
accessing from different sources a large amount of knowledge (Burt, 2000; Lacam & 260 
Salvetat, 2017).  261 
There will still be the need for firms to maintain strong ties with strategic partners 262 
however. For this reason, some authors have proposed the construction of a balanced network 263 
structure, also called “dual network structure” (Capaldo, 2007; Tiwana, 2008; Zaheer & Bell, 264 
2005). Such structure consists of a “network core” formed by few and strategic partners with 265 
whom the focal firm shares a bonding tie; and a myriad of bridging ties related to a large and 266 
unconnected periphery of other partners. A dual network relieves the redundancy of 267 
information, thanks to the ability of the focal firms to access a large and unconnected set of 268 
loosely-tied partners within the periphery of the network. However, at the same time, it 269 
fosters innovation, thanks to having few bonding ties with strategic partners at the core of the 270 
network. This leads to the development of our second set of propositions:   271 
 272 
Proposition 2.a: In a maturity phase, a portfolio structure with a predominance of 273 
bonding ties, which forms a close network structure, is favourable to the creation of 274 
knowledge recombination rents. 275 
 276 
Proposition 2.b: In a maturity phase, a portfolio structure with a predominance of 277 
bridging ties, which forms a sparse network structure, is favourable to the creation of 278 
knowledge recombination rents. 279 
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 280 
Proposition 2.c: In a maturity phase, a portfolio structure with a dual network 281 
structure, is more favourable than a sparse network structure to the creation of knowledge 282 
recombination rents. 283 
 284 
Strategy fit 285 
The second contingency that should find a fit with a firm inter-organizational 286 
portfolio concerns the strategic goals of firms participating in the relationships. To do this, 287 
we draw upon March’s (1991) Exploitation-Exploration framework (1991). Exploitation 288 
strategies aim to refine existing knowledge, competencies, and technologies, in other words 289 
the concern the uses of knowledge already possessed while exploration strategies are more 290 
experimental. The firm in this case engages in scanning activities and aims to discovering 291 
novel knowledge previously not available for the company and opportunities to get access to 292 
it. March’s (1991) framework is widely applied to alliance and network studies (e.g., Lavie & 293 
Rosenkopf, 2006; Lavikka, Smeds, & Jaatinen, 2015; Yamakawa, Yang, & Lin, 2011).  294 
Firms engage in exploitation relationships with the intention pooling together 295 
complementary resources and knowledge to better use the actual patrimony they already 296 
possess (Koza & Lewin, 1998). In such cases, agreements usually take the form of equity 297 
investments, licensing or franchising agreement, and emphasis is on results and control over 298 
the process, since at stake there is firm’s already consolidated knowledge (Lavie & 299 
Rosenkopf, 2006). In contrast, an exploration relationship is more likely to be used as a 300 
means to penetrate new markets, to develop new products and technological opportunities, 301 
and usually takes the form of an open-ended agreement, e.g. an R&D agreement or a learning 302 
joint venture. In such agreements, the emphasis is less on results and more on the interaction 303 
itself (Yamakawa et al., 2011). Beckman et al. (2004) assert that exploration relationship 304 
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strategies are executed by enlarging the size of network by creating new social interactions 305 
with new partners, while exploitation strategies reinforce existing relationships by reinforcing 306 
connections with the same partners (Woolfall, 2006). Most of the authors (e.g. Park, Chen, & 307 
Gallagher, 2002; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004) agreed on the idea that explorative and 308 
exploitative strategies can experience a fertile environment in a certain structure of the focal 309 
firm’s relationships portfolio. 310 
 Exploitation strategies will be more effective when supported by a nexus of dense 311 
and cohesive relationships (e.g., Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; Kogut, 2000), due to the fact that 312 
easy mobilisation of resources and tacit knowledge, and cooperation possible through 313 
bonding ties seem more proper (Obstfeld, 2005; Reagans & McEvily, 2003).  314 
 In contrast, exploration strategies  rely mostly on the creation of new ties with new 315 
actors, which allows them to access novel knowledge and possibly the knowledge available 316 
through the networks of these actors (Burt, 2004; Podolny and Baron, 1997). The creation of 317 
novel ideas in a close-knit structure can be drastically reduced due to isomorphism and 318 
standardization of knowledge’s flows inside it (Burt, 1992; Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000), that 319 
instead is vital in a not well-defined context along with dynamicity and flexibility (Sidhu, 320 
Commandeur, & Volberda, 2007).  321 
It has been observed that firms can have a “firm-genetic inclination” towards either an 322 
exploitation and exploration relationship strategy (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Rothaermel & 323 
Deeds, 2004; Yamakawa et al., 2011). This is because exploration and exploitation strategies 324 
can enact self-reinforcing loops. Exploration strategies are more uncertain than exploitation 325 
strategies and promote continuous and simultaneous investments in similarly explorative 326 
projects, partly to hedge the risk of failure in one project. Exploitation strategies, which tend 327 
to be more focused on outcomes within a short period, can be more alluring to managers 328 
under pressure to produce quick returns, for example due to pressure from shareholders or to 329 
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increase their personal prestige quickly (Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006). So either 330 
knowledge explorative or exploitative claim for more and successive same-type strategies to 331 
accelerate the process of obtaining results (Lavie & Rosenkop, 2006). Therefore we can 332 
propose:  333 
 334 
Proposition 3: Pursuing an exploitation strategy reinforces the creation of knowledge 335 
recombination rents if the firm possesses a close network structure. 336 
 337 
Proposition 4: Pursuing an exploration strategy reinforces the creation of knowledge 338 
recombination rents if the firm possesses a sparse network structure.  339 
 340 
To conclude, we can detect a possible “combined effect” that evolution stage and 341 
strategy can have in respect to the fit with a relationships portfolio. Giving the fact that 342 
entrepreneurial young ventures have an advantage relying on bonding affiliations and the 343 
creation of a close and dense network is favourable to an exploitation strategy, it is possible 344 
to highlight a strong potential for knowledge recombination rents using exploitation strategy 345 
in start-up phase to achieve simultaneous meliorations (e.g., Hine & Kapeleris, 2006; 346 
Yamakawa et al., 2011). For an established corporation, instead, the opposite is exactly true: 347 
pursuing an exploration strategy is positive from several perspectives (Burt, 1992; Zahra, 348 
2010).  349 
 350 
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External Knowledge recombination rents (external fit) 351 
The second group of contingencies presented in our model are those related to external fit, so 352 
the alignment that relationships may find with the overall structure of a firm’s portfolio. 353 
There are two types of contingency presented: past ties fit, so the “legacy” of previous 354 
relationships, and actual ties fit. Indeed from a dynamic angle, the formation of new 355 
partnerships deals with a structure of social interactions already constituted (actual network) 356 
and a history of interactions (past ties) (Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009; Parise & Casher, 2003).  357 
Past ties fit  358 
For analysing this fit, we draw upon literature related to the alliances and particularly 359 
the value of experience in such interactions (e.g. Gulati, Lavie, & Singh, 2009).   Many 360 
studies have argued that experience can improve the performance of inter-organizational 361 
relationships (e.g., Heimeriks, Klijn, & Reuer, 2009; Koza & Lewin, 1998; Lavie & 362 
Rosenkopf, 2006; Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999) due to the fact that proficiency in dealing 363 
with activities of partnerships in general or with specific partners can increase potential 364 
benefits.   365 
Know-how accrued from precedent partnerships can help improve a firm’s 366 
relationship management capabilities and establish routines for selecting partners and 367 
monitoring the performance of a relationship (Liebeskind, Oliver, Zucker, & Brewer, 1996). 368 
These capabilities are known as “relational capabilities” within the literature (Dyer & Singh, 369 
1998; Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999), i.e. the ability to identify relationship opportunities, 370 
manage interactive relationships, and establish relational routines (Gulati et al., 2009). As we 371 
premised however, we are not interested in study the actual processes that leads to the 372 
appropriation of such potential value that would be a pure dynamic capabilities approach 373 
(Zollo & Winter, 2002); rather we are arguing that the existence of a more developed stock of 374 
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relational capabilities (Koza & Lewin, 2000) offers per se potential value for knowledge 375 
recombination and its rents. 376 
In the extant literature, disagreement exists on what exactly should be considered 377 
“experience”. We can refer to two types of experience capital: the general and the specific 378 
ones; both predict that potential rents will decrease as the network of relationships increases 379 
in size and stabilising over time (Heimeriks & Duysters, 2007; Kale & Singh, 2007; 380 
Woolfall, 2006). We will start our discussion with the specific experience that is the set of 381 
precedent contacts with the same partner (Wassmer, 2010). While we broadly agree with this 382 
conceptualization of experience, there are other kinds of specificity that experience can have 383 
beyond the partner interactions. Markedly, we are drawing upon our considerations in the 384 
strategy fit section, to propose a strategy of specific experience (Koza & Lewin, 1998; Lavie 385 
& Rosenkopf, 2006). We have already pointed out how strategies are conservative in nature, 386 
since company actions, especially when they are successful, tend to result in the 387 
institutionalization of successful routines (Nelson & Winter, 2009), including  relational 388 
routines (Parise & Casher, 2003).  389 
There are two types specific experience: exploitation experience and exploration 390 
experience. Exploitation experience is created by routines that are established to improve the 391 
implementation of actions, while exploration experience consists of recombining novel 392 
knowledge (Finkelstein, 2009). In this case, not all of experiences can affect both future 393 
strategies outcomes (Heimeriks et al., 2009). What we propose is near to the concept of 394 
“diversity of ties” but applies to the context of past relationships, that is directing attention on 395 
“cluster” of relations similar for attributes of partners firms or knowledge to manage (Jiang et 396 
al., 2010; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009; Phelps, 2010).  397 
For every new social interaction settled by a corporation concordant in type with the 398 
previous ones, management can structure, collaborate, and control the new relationship in the 399 
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best way they know. In the case of a non-concordant strategy, it can exist an “organizational 400 
inertia” (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006) since for the management is easier to continue applying 401 
company’s consolidated routines. But this does not consider important divergent learning 402 
paths and interaction diversity, which can sharply diminish potential outcomes of a 403 
relationship. For example, exploitation is based on short-term results and its control is result-404 
oriented, while in exploration strategy, with its uncertainty, the control is process-oriented 405 
(Gupta et al., 2006; Koza & Lewin, 1998; Rothaermel, 2001; Yamakawa et al., 2011). That 406 
implies a completely different contract structuring and forma mentis approach to strategy. 407 
Applying a mistaken repertory of routines, inevitably fosters the failure of a relationship. It 408 
seems plausible that such specific experience has a direct influence on potential relationship 409 
gains due to a specialization of routines directly applicable to a strategy context, or at least 410 
they can be given as rules for structuring and governing the relationship process. Thus, we 411 
postulate: 412 
 413 
Proposition 5a: A relationship increases the creation of knowledge recombination 414 
rents if a firm possesses a concordant specific experience.  415 
 416 
Proposition 5b: A relationship hinders the creation of knowledge recombination rents 417 
if a firm possesses a non-concordant specific experience.  418 
    419 
Considering instead, general experience this can be related to every previous firms’ 420 
interactions (Gulati et al., 2009), and as pointed out by successive works of Kale and Singh 421 
(2007, 2009) and Heimeriks and colleagues (2007; 2009) this type of experience supports the 422 
success of a relationship only in an indirect way. This also appraises general experience as 423 
less relevant in performance outcomes compared the specific one (Wassmer, 2010). General 424 
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experience so is helpful only when consents a better relationship process and learning thanks 425 
to the codification and sharing of explicit knowledge (Holmberg & Cummings, 2009). To 426 
facilitate such transfer of best practices, management should be forced to dedicate attention 427 
to the such problem (Kale & Singh, 2007; Parise & Casher, 2003), having managerial roles 428 
specifically dedicated to partnerships, such as an alliance manager or in some cases even a 429 
dedicated function. Therefore, we propose:  430 
 431 
Proposition 6: A new tie despite its nature can increase the creation of knowledge 432 
recombination rents if the firm possesses formal structure and/or routines dedicated to the 433 
relationship process.  434 
 435 
Actual ties fit  436 
A crucial aspect of knowledge recombination rents creation in the same portfolio is 437 
the possibility to share resources among several relationships. Vassolo et al. (2004), for 438 
instance, accredited that a portfolio which is full of competing projects has a sub-additive 439 
effects on each one. This is closely coupled to the concepts of real options where the firm 440 
must choose between incompatible projects. In contrast, shared resources across relationships 441 
has the potential to create economies of scope and can have a super-additive effect upon a 442 
firm’s portfolio of inter-organizational relationships.  443 
Lavie (2009) considers the effect of having competing relationship partners in a 444 
firm’s portfolio, also known as coopetition (Le Roy & Czakon, 2016). If a direct (bilateral) 445 
coopetition can weaken the results of a relationship, the competition among partners 446 
(multilateral coopetition) can strengthen the power of the focal firm which is in a position to 447 
gain more potential profits. For example, empirical insights from a recent review on 448 
coopetition (Le Roy & Czakon, 2016) shows how in network environments cooperation with 449 
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competitors led to better performance. Nevertheless, the problem of competing partners is 450 
controversial; whereas for a venture can be advantageous have competing firms in its 451 
portfolio if this process is not coupled with a strong process of communication and trust, 452 
partners can decide to interrupt their relations (White & Siu‐Yun Lui, 2005). However, this 453 
last concern is more based on the process of appropriation of rents, that is beyond the scope 454 
of our paper. To conclude our model, we present the following propositions: 455 
 456 
Proposition 7a: A new tie, despite its nature, can ameliorate the creation of 457 
knowledge recombination rents if it relies upon shared resources with other ties. 458 
 459 
Proposition 7b: A new tie, despite its nature, can reduce the creation of knowledge 460 
recombination rents if it relies upon competing resources with other ties. 461 
 462 
Managerial implications and suggestions 463 
In table 2, a summary of the whole set of propositions we created is reported.  464 
**** Insert table 2 about here**** 465 
 466 
This paper has the ambitious aim of structuring a model that can easily offer a “map” 467 
to evaluate many implications of starting a new collaboration in relation to its impact in terms 468 
of increase or decrease of the network value of the whole portfolio. 469 
  In relation to the evolution stage our model would represent an encouragement for 470 
entrepreneurs/start-uppers to invest heavily in external collaboration with the aim of fast-471 
developing strong relations that can last (Lacam & Salvetat, 2017; Reagans & McEvily, 472 
2003). This approach would “quickly” accrue a consistent stock of social capital, which can 473 
be leveraged to get access to external resources and partners’ skills (Yli-Renko et al., 2001) 474 
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(proposition 1.a). Due to a lack of well-developed internal capital, especially in terms of 475 
human and financial capital, instead it is not recommendable to interact and partner only with 476 
arm-length partners or on a sporadic basis since the cost of controlling the relation would be 477 
too high (White & Siu-Yun Lui, 2005; Williamson, 1975) (proposition 1.b). 478 
For an established business, instead, the situation is almost the reverse. Partnering 479 
only with well-known counterparts, may trap the firm in its own strategic space (Uzzi, 1997; 480 
Wassmer, 2010), reducing the possibility to renovate social capital and to span the traditional 481 
competition territories (proposition 2.a). This approach may indeed pose the firm in a strong 482 
defensive position rather than be proactive and catch or even promote market changes, that 483 
can be better addressed by continuously exploring new partnerships (Rothaermel, 2001) 484 
(proposition 2.b). However, as proposed, a balance view seems to be the best solution: a 485 
bundle of partners who can really sustain the implementation of any strategic action 486 
(Batocchio et al., 2016), coupled with a larger in number “periphery” represented by new 487 
relationships to sound the competitive arena and track new innovation leads (Capaldo, 2007; 488 
Tiwana, 2008) (proposition 2.c). Thus, for relationship managers of established companies, 489 
the suggestion is to carefully map the whole set of firm’s relations to evaluate those more 490 
strategic to be kept stable, while continuously engaging with new explorative collaborations 491 
(Lavikka et al., 2015). 492 
In relation to the strategy adopted, we would recommend investing in relational 493 
resources to partner with trustful and well-known partners when the firm’s strategy is devoted 494 
to exploit and consolidate positions and rip benefits of an innovation for example (Ozcan & 495 
Eisenhardt, 2009). In this case, strong relations will definitely help in implementing and 496 
executing such actions (Batocchio et al., 2016) since the adaption capability in the knowledge 497 
transfer will be higher (Williams, 2007) with minor coordination costs (White & Siu-Yun 498 
Lui, 2005; Williamson, 1991) (proposition 3). Contrary, due to the intrinsic uncertainty of an 499 
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exploratory project, the firm and its relationship managers should engage with a plurality of 500 
subjects that gradually will be evaluated and in case replaced (White & Siu-Yun Lui, 2005) if 501 
not of a transversal utility among different knowledge platform (Lavikka et al., 2015) 502 
(proposition 4). 503 
Looking at the experiences of firms in dealing with alliances and collaborative 504 
relationships, we have pointed out how a specific strategy experience in partnering may 505 
improve the ability to recombine the knowledge coming from that type of interaction 506 
(proposition 5.a) thanks a better adaption (Williams, 2007). However, this effect may also 507 
create a path dependency (Koka & Prescott, 2008; Zollo & Winter, 2002), which may lead to 508 
reiterate an erroneous adaption to of knowledge transfer in case of changing strategy 509 
(proposition 5.b). To moderate this clashing effects, we encourage any firms to establish 510 
formal structures that could keep track of repertory routine so that the tacit knowledge 511 
derivate from the experience may be replicate in an easier manner (Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 512 
2009; Williams, 2007) (proposition 6).  513 
Finally, in terms of sharing of resources among different relationships, relying on the 514 
possibility of replication of routines and with non-exclusive resources (Williamson, 1991) 515 
may increase the potential creation of network value (proposition 7.a). Instead for the 516 
opposite condition, i.e. locking-in resources to specific relationships may reduce the ability to 517 
leverage them on different projects (Le Roy & Czakon, 2016), and the relative synergic value 518 
arising (proposition 7.b). 519 
 520 
Conclusion 521 
In the last two decades, inter-organizational relationships have become increasingly 522 
important to the survival and success of firms, especially those firms whose competitive 523 
advantage depends upon innovation (e.g., Chung et al., 2006). Few contributions have 524 
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approached in a comprehensive way the problem of potential transfers of knowledge within a 525 
portfolio of relationships. The prevalent literature deals with partnerships individually in a 526 
dyadic perspective even if multiple relations co-exist and thus analyses of this type 527 
completely disregard potential interactions that multiple ties could have (Lavie, 2009).  528 
Our work aims to confer a theoretical orienting compass, in the tradition of RV, 529 
which propose to a fit (Zajac, Kraatz, & Bresser, 2000) a contingent variable, either internal 530 
or external, in relation to a firm’s relationships portfolio. Contributing to a growing field of 531 
research (e.g., Zhao, 2014), we presented a holistic framework on the network rents, 532 
especially dedicated to the simultaneous management of more than one tie.  533 
Our main contributions to the literature are basically two: first, we clearly defined the 534 
concept of knowledge recombination rents applied to a firm’s inter-organizational portfolio; 535 
and, second, we inquired which contingencies may hinder or propel the creation of such 536 
rents. Our concept goes beyond the dyadic relational rents since refers to network rents 537 
specifically the ones arising from the recombination of knowledge within a firm’s ego-538 
network. This affirms again that the value of a knowledge transfer is not always and only 539 
determined by the exchange itself. Rather, such value can be increased after the exchange 540 
thanks to a recombination with other “pieces” of knowledge obtainable from the firm’s 541 
network, so related to other business relationships (Woolfall, 2006).  542 
Regarding our second contribution, a first category of conditions, evolution stage and 543 
contents of strategy, relates to the internal situation of the firm and how this should be 544 
aligned with the portfolio structure for boosting recombination of knowledge in the network 545 
space (internal knowledge recombination rents). The second category of conditions considers 546 
the portfolio itself. The knowledge transfer can be increased in state of consonance of the 547 
overall portfolio (actual ties fit) and/or of previous experience (past ties fits) (external 548 
knowledge recombination rents).  549 
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The value of our model is to have put together, in a same framework, all the vital 550 
attributes to look at, beyond the partnerships dyadic level. Such theoretical contributions 551 
combined represent also strong managerial implications of this work; first our work indicates 552 
an additional crucial area of attention for relationship managers as much as any other 553 
manager involved in external partnerships, such as a R&D director, an alliance manager, a 554 
supply chain manger, and not least the whole general direction. Such managers should pay 555 
equally attention to the dyadic level of the relation (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006), which 556 
represents the actual value of the relation and of the knowledge transfer, but also to the value 557 
that such knowledge can acquire after the exchange, thanks indeed to a recombination. While 558 
traditional practitioner-oriented literature about alliance managers (e.g., Lynch, 1993; 559 
Spekman, Isabella, & MacAvoy, 2000) considers mostly the first aspect, in recent evolutions 560 
(e.g., Zoogah & Peng, 2011) a general emphasis on the adaptive capacity of such a manager 561 
to design a coherent portfolio is much more prominent and we echo such claims. Yet, we 562 
offered a quite detail and practical tool formed by 7 propositions that should be checked 563 
before engaging with a new relationship as detailed reported in the managerial implication 564 
section. The possibility of evaluating ex-ante, not only the value of the relationship but also 565 
its potential to increase firm performance after the interaction, is a powerful tool at 566 
disposition of alliance managers or any other manager deputy to the management of external 567 
relationships.     568 
 We see particularly two contexts where our model and its application could be 569 
crucial: the first is in relation to a firm with an incumbent position (Christensen & Bower, 570 
1996), that it is not favourable to radically innovate. Thus, the primary task of a relationship 571 
manager is structuring a relationship portfolio that can sustain innovation and delivering 572 
externally the strategic renewal not achievable internally (e.g., Liebeskind et al., 1996; 573 
Rothaermel, 2001). However, in doing so the consideration of the specific past experience 574 
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should be taken into account, as we shown in our proposition 3 and 4. Yet, a manager should 575 
try to continuously renovate the geometry of its relationship portfolio, as shown in 576 
proposition 2 (.a, .b, .c).  577 
The ability of a manager to control in advance the impacts of a new collaboration 578 
results similarly crucial in situations of strong ambiguity, for example where to clearly assess 579 
the effects of a relationship the time span is quite long. Examples of this could be referred to 580 
the biotechnology sector where a trial conclusion and the related approval from the public 581 
agency (e.g. Food and Drug Agency (FDA) in U.S.) may take years, usually more than ten; a 582 
period long enough to seriously compromise the ability company to survive if a wrong 583 
relationship is started. The possibility of having an ex-ante detailed evaluation of the fit of a 584 
new collaboration with the regards of the overall portfolio structure, can reduce the risk of 585 
uncertainty and the negative effects. 586 
Further research in relation to our study can be moved in two directions: an 587 
interpretation of the appropriation scheme for the knowledge recombination rents, moving 588 
from a potential to a concrete level of incremented firm performance. Also, an empirical 589 
validation of our proposition must be done to strengthen our results. One good applicative 590 
example is represented by the whole technology- and knowledge-intense sector such as the 591 
biotechnology and pharmaceutics, internet of things (IoT) and the 2.0 web (e.g., Caputo, 592 
Marzi, & Pellegrini, 2016; Trequattrini, Shams, Lardo, & Lombardi, 2016). Moreover, future 593 
research could investigate the impact of knowledge recombination rents in the different 594 
phases of a maturity stage of firm, particularly, it would be interesting to understand how 595 
they would impact phases of crisis, decline and rejuvenation (e.g., McKinley, 1993; Stopford 596 
& Baden-Fuller, 1990). 597 
A limitation of our study is the broad generalization that we made in our propositions, 598 
which can be affected also by other conditions independent from what we have called 599 
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internal and external fits. These considerations are rooted in the general environments, like a 600 
balancing effect in the relationship portfolio pertinent to the geographic localization of the 601 
firm (the cluster or district effect) (Lacam & Salvetat, 2017) or the structural situation of the 602 
industry which can widely change the general proactive orientation of those engaging in 603 
partnerships.  604 
 605 
  606 
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List of Tables 801 
Table 1. The “three pillars” of the knowledge recombination rents  802 
What? Recombination of knowledge obtained or spilled from a partner with the ones obtained or spilled from 
one or more partners  
How? The range of opportunities to recombine derives from the network (Potential knowledge recombination 
rents), but real recombination happens only into an alliance context with a specific partner (Realized 
knowledge recombination rents)  
When? To facilitate the process of creation of potential rents, the network should assume specific 
configurations in accord with endogenous firm conditions (internal fit) and exogenous contingences of 
the network itself (external fit). 
 803 
 804 
 805 
Table 2. Proposition summary	806 
Internal fit 
 
Proposition 1.a: In a start-up phase, a portfolio structure with a predominance of bonding ties, which forms a close 
network structure, will be most favourable to the creation of knowledge recombination rents.  
Proposition 1.b: In a start-up phase, a portfolio structure with a predominance of bridging ties, which forms a sparse 
network structure, is unfavourable to the creation of knowledge recombination rents. 
 
Proposition 2.a: In a maturity phase, a portfolio structure with a predominance of bonding ties, which forms a close 
network structure, is favourable to the creation of knowledge recombination rents. 
Proposition 2.b: In a maturity phase, a portfolio structure with a predominance of bridging ties, which forms a sparse 
network structure, is favourable to the creation of knowledge recombination rents. 
Proposition 2.c: In a maturity phase, a portfolio structure with a dual network structure, is more favourable than a sparse 
network structure to the creation of knowledge recombination rents. 
 
Proposition 3: Pursuing an exploitation strategy reinforces the creation of knowledge recombination rents if the firm 
possesses a close network structure. 
 
Proposition 4: Pursuing an exploration strategy reinforces the creation of knowledge recombination rents if the firm 
possesses a sparse network structure.   
 
External fit	
 
Proposition 5a: A relationship increases the creation of knowledge recombination rents if a firm possesses a concordant 
specific experience.  
Proposition 5b: A relationship hinders the creation of knowledge recombination rents if a firm possesses a non-
concordant specific experience.  
 
Proposition 6: A new tie despite its nature can increase the creation of knowledge recombination rents if the firm 
possesses formal structure and/or routines dedicated to the relationship process.  
 
Proposition 7a: A new tie, despite its nature, can ameliorate the creation of knowledge recombination rents if it relies 
upon shared resources with other ties. 
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Proposition 7b: A new tie, despite its nature, can reduce the creation of knowledge recombination rents if it relies upon 
competing resources with other ties. 
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